‘Bonus Bonds' for Bankers: A New Type of Debt-Based Remuneration in the Financial Industry by Seiler, Moritz & Fischer, Damian
‘Bonus Bonds’ for Bankers:
A New Type of Debt-Based Remuneration
in the Financial Industry
by
Moritz Seiler* and Damian Fischer**
Remuneration involving shares or options was long thought to provide optimal employee
incentivisation, aligning employee interests with those of shareholders. However, the numer-
ous failures of financial institutions during the financial crisis have given rise to a concern that
equity-based remuneration may have encouraged excessive risk-taking. Therefore, some
scholars now recommend that ‘key risk takers’ in banks be induced to think like bondholders,
e.g., by compensating them via debt-based instruments. It is suggested that, due to their
characteristics in financial distress, contingent capital bonds are better suited for this task
than straight bonds.
This article explores the emergence of debt-based remuneration in banks and its evaluation in
the literature. We examine international and selected national regulatory frameworks and
inquire into current market practice. Our comparative analysis reveals that, despite occasion-
ally misleading terminology, none of the observed remuneration programmes technically uses
‘bonus bonds’. Rather, they involve cash awards subject to adjustment during a deferral
period upon drops in certain financial metrics. Convincing by their flexibility, we consider
these malus-structures appropriate tools for curbing bankers’ risk appetites as they allow
banks to set largely identical incentives as ‘bonus bonds’ without having to procure securities
in illiquid markets when awards vest.
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This paper is based on our respective presentations given in German at the annual
conference of the University of Zurich Research Priority Programme in Financial Mar-
ket Regulation (<http://www.finreg.uzh.ch/index_en.html>), which was held on 2 and
3 June 2014 at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. This Research Programme is
jointly run by chairs from the Law Faculty and the Economics Faculty of the University
of Zurich and promotes an interdisciplinary exchange of ideas through regular work-
shops, from which we have both greatly benefited. We owe particular gratitude to Prof.
Rolf Sethe, Vanessa Isler and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. A collection of the contributions to the aforementioned
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I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, financial institutions began to issue
bonds that, upon the occurrence of pre-specified trigger events, would either
be converted into equity securities or be completely or partially written
down.1 Thanks to their allegedly improved loss-absorbing capabilities over
other forms of hybrid debt, these contingent capital securities also found
support from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and subsequently
from regulators across the world, particularly in Europe, where contingent
capital securities have been recognised as regulatory capital under current
regulatory capital requirements. Such new regulations in Europe and else-
where, coupled with stronger capital requirements in general, have in turn
led to a steady increase in issuances of contingent capital securities.
The emergence of this new form of hybrid capital has coincided with, and may
have facilitated, the development of incentive schemes revolving around debt-
based instruments that involve write-down mechanisms. Such write-down
mechanisms put the investment of the employees at risk in a fashion that
would otherwise be characteristic of equity-based remuneration as the em-
ployees will stand to lose their entire claim upon occurrence of a write-down
trigger. At the same time, unlike some equity-based instruments, debt-based
1 Triggers in contingent capital securities now usually refer to the issuer’s capital ratio for
the timing of conversion or write-down, but other design options have been discussed in
the literature. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent
Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight’ (2011) 111 Columbia
Law Review 795, 830—832. In the following, we use the term of ‘contingent capital
securities’ indiscriminately for instruments featuring either a conversion or a write-down
mechanism.
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instruments are not thought to incentivize employees to take on excessive risk
as the return on their investment being independent of the profit of the firm.
Furthermore, awarding debt-based remuneration to the management is an
attractive proposition to shareholders as it does away with either or both
the dilution of their voting power or the requirement to share dividends that
usually comes with traditional equity-based incentives schemes.2 Beginning in
2011, some banks in the UK3 and in Switzerland4 have thus introduced ‘bonus
bonds’ as a means of remuneration.
However, we find that these banks have yet to pay their employees in actually
issued bond securities. Instead, they have added special malus provisions to
what are essentially cash-based incentive plans, whereby the terms of contin-
gent capital securities were, to some extent, replicated on a contractual basis.
Some banks have reserved the right to fulfil their obligations under their
schemes by handing out contingent capital securities, but in all cases we re-
viewed, cash remains the default payment option. This begs the question of
why contingent capital securities have not proven to be a more popular tool
for the purposes of remuneration, and whether awarding contingent capital
securities in kind would be preferable to cash-based awards that replicate the
terms of contingent capital securities on a contractual basis.
To examine the viability of contingent capital securities as a tool for remuner-
ation, we start out by taking a look at the literature on debt-based remuner-
ation (II.), showing that it is highly controversial among scholars whether
contingent capital securities, or other debt-based instruments for that matter,
should be included in remuneration packages. Whereas global standards on
remuneration are rather silent on the matter, quite the opposite is true for EU
regulations. Our examination thereof (III.A) is followed by a review of UK
(III.B), German (III.C) and Swiss (III.D) regulatory frameworks, in each case
juxtaposed to a survey of debt-based remuneration schemes in use in each such
country’s financial sector. Based on the findings we gather from these juris-
dictions, it appears that debt-based remuneration schemes are, in general,
becoming increasingly popular with banks. We conclude that the current pro-
pensity of banks to award synthetic ‘bonus bonds’, i.e., deferred cash awards
subject to special malus provisions, rather than contingent capital securities, is
justified mainly for two reasons. First, such cash-based awards can be struc-
2 See Agne Eriksson & Harry McVea, ‘The Vexed Issue of Bankers’ Pay: Is it now time for
CoCos?’, (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 97, 100 and 101; Reto Schiltknecht
& Christopher McHale, ‘Entwicklungen des regulatorischen Bankenkapitals’ [2015]
Swiss Journal of Corporate and Capital Markets Law and Reorganizations (GesKR) 8,
17.
3 For details on Barclay’s contingent capital plan, see nn 104–110 and accompanying text.
4 For further discussion of Swiss banks’ remuneration structures, see nn 180–187 and
accompanying text.
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tured so as to set incentives virtually identical to those associated with con-
tingent capital securities whilst giving institutions a much greater deal of
flexibility in structuring awards. Second, although the market in contingent
capital securities is growing, liquidity in the market may be a concern because
banks may need large quantities of contingent capital securities available when
awards made to employees vest. Unless they can issue contingent capital
securities on an as-needed basis, banks might find it hard, or at least expensive,
to come by a sufficient amount of contingent capital securities in the market.
II. The Case for Using Debt-Based Instruments as Incentives
A. Overview of the Academic Debate
For decades, studies on the remuneration of (bank) executives5 concentrated
almost exclusively on equity instruments.6 From a corporate governance per-
spective, equity-based remuneration has long been considered superior to
other forms of remuneration due to its perceived effect of aligning the interests
of managers with those of shareholders, thus helping to bridge the gap be-
tween principal and agent. However, one of the findings from examining
remuneration structures before the financial crisis was that this alignment only
takes real effect when grants of stock or stock options are subject to consid-
erable deferral, ideally with employees precluded from hedging or other meas-
ures that aim to mitigate the risk associated with their holdings.7 Accordingly,
5 Up until recently, studies had been largely oblivious to the remuneration of non-execu-
tive employees. For two current studies on remuneration of non-executives, see Viral
Acharya, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, ‘Seeking Alpha, Taking Risk: Evidence
from Non-Executive Pay in U.S. Bank Holding Companies’ (2014) Wharton Financial
Institutions Center Working Paper Series No. 13–18 <http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/
papers/13/p1318.htm> accessed 5 June 2015; Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead,
‘Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition’ (Cornell Law School Legal
Studies Research Paper Series No. 13–87) (2015) 100 Cornell Law Review (forthcoming),
manuscript at 38ff <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307216> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015 (arguing that non-cash based awards may also be advantageous in
respect of non-executive employees).
6 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, ‘CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much You
Pay, but How’ [1990] (3) Harvard Business Review 138, 141. See also Simone M. Sepe,
‘Response. Give ‘Em Enough Rope: Optimal Design of Executive Pay and Rent Extrac-
tion’ (2011) 89 Texas Law Review See Also 143, 144.
7 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press 2004), ch 14 (highlighting
this issue well before the financial crisis began in 2007); Kenneth R. French et al, The
Squam Lake Report. Fixing the Financial System (Princeton University Press 2010), 50.
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many international and national guidelines now recommend for variable re-
muneration, or at least a large portion thereof, to be deferred.8
More recently, the previously undisputed notion of the overall advantageous-
ness of equity-based remuneration has been called into question in the context
of financial firms. The most recent financial crisis has shown that shareholders’
interests can diverge significantly from those of creditors, such as bondholders
and depositors, let alone those of taxpayers, who were called upon repeatedly
to bail-out institutions deemed to be too big to fail. As Bebchuk & Spamann9
show in a series of stylised examples, shareholders will often be willing for
their bank to take on more risk than is socially desirable, especially when the
bank is already in turmoil, i.e., when equity is decreasing at a high pace. Once
the shareholders are faced with losing their capital contributions, they can
only benefit from risky projects as they will rake in the upside. Meanwhile,
the downside risk of such projects will largely be borne by creditors, or, in the
event of a bail-out, the taxpayers. Bebchuk & Spamann and other authors10
have therefore called for incentives in banks to be linked in some way or
another to the firm’s debt, bringing interests of bank executives more in line
with those of creditors and taxpayers. Their proposals often turn on specific
debt-based instruments.11 While differing in the details, all of those proposals
8 See, e.g., FSF, ‘FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices’ (2 April 2009) Prin-
ciple No. 6 <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015.
9 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers’ Pay’ (2010) 98 George-
town Law Journal 247, 255 ff.
10 The idea was originally developed in the 1970s by Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 352ff, but has only recently
found larger resonance within the literature. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran
& Joel Shapiro, ‘Executive Compensation and Risk Taking’ [2010] Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Staff Report no. 456 (June 2010, revised November 2011); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, ‘Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms:
The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay’ [2012] Columbia Business Law Review
834, 848; French et al, n 7, 50; Wulf A. Kaal, ‘Contingent Capital in Executive Com-
pensation’ (2012) 69 Washington & Lee Law Review 1821, 1825; Eriksson & McVea, n 2,
112; Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensa-
tion for Risk Regulation, (2011) 105 Northwestern University Law Review 1205, 1206.
11 Bebchuk & Spamann, n 9, 284 (basket of equity and debt securities); Bolton, Mehran &
Shapiro, n 10, 1 (linking of CEO’s compensation to CDS spread); Gordon, n 10, 854
(conversion of executives’ equity holdings in the event of the firm’s experiencing tur-
moil); Kaal, n 10, 1826 (high trigger contingent capital securities); Eriksson & McVea,
n 2, 116, 118 (standard trigger contingent capital securities coupled with potential ex-
post adjustment); The Squam Lake Group, ‘Aligning Incentives at Systemically Impor-
tant Financial Institutions. A Proposal by the Squam Lake Group’ (2013) 25(4) Journal
of Applied Corporate Finance 37, 40 (portion of remuneration held back and subject to
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have at their core a better alignment of interests of employees with those of
bondholders. These proposals also add to the broader discussion on ‘inside
debt’,12 a term that is commonly understood to encompass all financial obli-
gations of a corporation towards its staff, including pension and deferred
remuneration claims employees hold against the firm, as opposed to debt held
by other creditors. Whereas equity incentives are to induce employees to avoid
bankruptcy, inside debt additionally provides employees with an incentive to
maintain a high recovery value in bankruptcy for they will only then be able to
recover a part of their claim against their employer.13 This does of course not
apply to contingent capital securities that will be written off when the capital
ratio drops below a pre-specified threshold, which may happen well before
bankruptcy.
However, some commentators put forward some valid concerns regarding the
introduction of new remuneration incentives, especially when forced upon
banks by the regulators,14 and also warn against an overreliance on debt-based
remuneration. They contend that new incentive instruments will only add
further layers of complexity to remuneration systems, thereby increasing
the likelihood that bank employees will be unable to discern what behaviour
is expected of them.15 Furthermore, the main beneficiaries of bail-outs during
the financial crisis were not the shareholders but the bondholders. Therefore,
forfeiture in the event of capital ratio dropping below specified threshold); Tung, n 10,
1229ff (publicly traded subordinated debt securities).
12 Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, ‘Inside Debt’ (2011) 15 Revue of Finance 75, 75 fn 1; Chenyang
Wei & David Yermack, ‘Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives’ (2011) 24
Review of Financial Studies 3813 (defining inside debt as debt held by ‘corporate in-
siders’ as opposed to debt held by ‘corporate outsiders’). For a recent study on the
favourable correlation between inside debt and (lower) corporate failure rates, see Ngoc
Giang Hoang, ‘Inside Debt and Corporate Failure’ (unpublished manuscript) <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2351718> accessed 5 June 2015.
13 Edmans & Liu, n 12, 77; Eriksson & McVea, n 2, 99.
14 Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, ‘Economics, Politics, and the Interna-
tional Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis of Executive Pay at
European Banks’ (2011) 64 Vanderbilt Law Review 431, 451 (arguing that regulators
should leave the design of remuneration schemes to company boards and rather resort
to more traditional means of regulation to curb excessive remuneration, e.g., by impos-
ing stronger capital requirements on institutions adopting inadequate remuneration
schemes).
15 Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, ‘The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay:
Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation’ (2012) 38 The Journal
of Corporation Law 53, 72ff; Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, ‘Getting
Incentives Right: Is Deferred Bank Executive Compensation Sufficient?’ (EGCI Work-
ing Papier Series in Law No 241/2014) (2014–2015) 32 Yale Journal on Regulation
(forthcoming), manuscript at 37 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2395982> accessed 5 June 2015.
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the reasonable expectation that they will be bailed out along with other hold-
ers of corporate debt may cancel out any positive impact inside debt is deemed
to have upon the behaviour of employees.16 As long as equity-based instru-
ments remain part of the remuneration package, employees might also be
inclined to make up for potential losses suffered on the debt-based portion
of remuneration by assuming additional risk that can increase the value of their
equity-based portion.17 Lastly, it is evident from the financial crisis that the
overall interest of social welfare also requires inter-bank lending to continue in
times of financial turmoil. Executives that are too risk-averse due to the in-
centives set through debt-based remuneration might exacerbate an imminent
crisis.18
B. The Role of ‘Bonus Bonds’ in Particular
Taking inspiration from new incentive plans in a few major European banks,19
some authors20 have recently advocated the use of contingent capital securities21
for purposes of remuneration. It is argued that providing remuneration in the
form of contingent capital securities improves the link between risk taking and
decision making by aligning interests due to the automatic trigger mechanism,
and that contingent capital securities are therefore to be considered superior to
straight bonds without such conversion or write-off features. With a view to
16 Alces & Galle, n 15, 68ff; Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, n 15, 39.
17 Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, n 15, 40. See also Eriksson & McVea, n 2, 116.
18 Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, n 15, 42. See also Simone M. Sepe, ‘Making Sense of Exec-
utive Compensation’ (2011) 36 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 189, 222ff (criticis-
ing ‘perverse incentives’set by long-term debt-based remuneration, supporting instead a
mix of fixed remuneration and equity instruments).
19 See nn 104–114 (Barclays PLC) and nn 180–187 (UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG)
and accompanying text.
20 Eriksson & McVea, n 2, 118 (recommending standard trigger contingent capital secur-
ities that convert to equity); Kaal, n 9, 1826 (recommending high trigger contingent
capital securities that convert to equity); Erkki Liikanen et al, ‘Report of the European
Commission’s High-level Expert Group on Bank Structural Reform’ (2 October 2012),
104 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report
_en.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015; Bank of England, ‘Financial Stability Report’ (Novem-
ber 2012), 57 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2012/
fsr32sec5.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015; Vanessa Brahmi, ‘Contingent Convertibles – Die
Auswirkungen von Basel III auf Bankanleihen’ in Henrik Schütt (ed) Deutsches Institut
für Bankwirtschaft Schriftenreihe Band 7 (2011), at 6.
21 Sometimes referred to as ‘bonus bonds’. See, e.g., The Squam Lake Group, n 11, 37. For
a concise description from a legal point of view of the mechanisms behind contingent
convertible bonds, with a view to their potential for utilization as remuneration, see
Eriksson & McVea, n 2, 98—104.
ECFR 3/2015 ‘Bonus Bonds’ for Bankers 431
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 4:23 PM
further improving incentive structures, Kaal recommends theuseofhightrigger
contingent convertible bonds, i.e., bonds that convert to equity once the bank’s
capital ratio drops below a pre-specified threshold set above the threshold used
for contingent convertible bonds issued to external investors.22
Referring to UBS AG’s remuneration scheme as a particularly laudable exam-
ple, some senior economists strongly advocate holdback, or deferral, of a cash-
based portion of remuneration that is to be forfeited in the event of the firm
becoming distressed.23 In terms of incentives, this proposition is somewhat
reminiscent of awarding write-down bonds to employees in the sense that
holders of write-down bonds are similarly exposed to losing their investment
in the firm’s financial downturn. Financial institutions can implement the
economists’ proposal by exposing cash-based awards to a special malus pro-
vision during a pre-defined deferral period, i.e., the time before payouts to
employees occur. Typically, malus, and thus forfeiture of awards, would be
made contingent upon the occurrence of a pre-specified event. Where such
event is defined exclusively in relation to the capital ratio, or where express
reference is made to the performance of a contingent capital instrument, the
incentives for the individual employee are broadly identical to awarding him
or her with actual contingent capital securities. After all, employees are un-
likely to care whether they lose remuneration due to a write-down trigger in a
bond or a malus clause in an employment contract or other kind of agreement.
Therefore, having cash-based remuneration schemes replicate contingent
capital instruments on a purely contractual basis, i.e., synthetically, may be a
valid alternative to handing out contingent capital securities to employees.
However, it has to be noted that contingent capital securities and, to a some-
what lesser extent perhaps, contractual replications of contingent capital se-
curities, pose an array of issues, which have frequently been discussed in
economic literature24 and may also take into question their usability for pur-
poses of remuneration. Some scholars even question the viability of the con-
22 Kaal, n 9, 1853ff (arguing that without a conversion feature executives do not have a
stake in the liquidation value and are thus just as prone to excessive risk-taking as when
paid in equity-based instruments). But see Eriksson & McVea, n 2, 118 (warning that too
high a trigger would be likely to severely limit tradability in the secondary market, and
therefore preferring the standard trigger of 5.125% provided for in EU regulations with
regard to AT 1 capital).
23 The Squam Lake Group, n 11, 39 f.
24 E.g., regarding pricing and the design of the conversion trigger. See, e.g., Stefan Avdjiev,
Anastasia Kartasheva & Bilyana Bogdanova, ‘CoCos: a primer’ (2013) BIS Quarterly
Review (September 2013) 43, 44ff; Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, ‘How to
Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-
to-Fail Problem’ (2013) 25 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 39, 46ff; Robert
L. McDonald, ‘Contingent capital with a dual price trigger’ (2013) 9 Journal of Financial
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cept of such hybrid capital as a whole, advocating significantly tougher equity
requirements instead.25
Up to now, proposals for the inclusion of contingent capital securities in
remuneration structures have found little resonance both within the global
academic debate and the global standards on remuneration.26 Neither the FSF
Principles for Sound Compensation Practices nor the accompanying Imple-
mentation Standards address the use of debt-based securities for purposes of
remuneration. They do, however, encourage a broad use of malus and claw-
back arrangements,27 which, as discussed above, in conjunction with deferral,
transforms cash-based remuneration into inside debt.
Bearing in mind the alleged advantages as well as shortcomings of debt-based
remuneration, we now turn to analysing the extent to which the notion of
‘bonus bonds’ has been taken into account in European standards on remu-
neration.
III. Regulatory Frameworks and Market Practice with Regard
to Debt-Based Remuneration in Europe
A. European Union Legislation and Regulations
1. Regulatory Efforts in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009
The European Commission (Commission) had already issued recommenda-
tions concerning directors’ remuneration well before the financial crisis.28
However, neither these recommendations nor regulatory efforts29 that imme-
Stability 230, 231 ff; Edward Simpson Prescott, ‘Contingent Capital: The Trigger Pro-
blem’ (2012) 98(1) Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 33, 34 ff.
25 See Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes: What’s Wrong with
Banking and What to Do about It (Princeton University Press 2013) 187 ff.
26 See FSF Principles, n 8; FSB, ‘Principles for Sound Compensation Practices. Implemen-
tation Standards’ (25 September 2009) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publi
cations/r_090925c.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015. For a concise discussion thereof, see
Yannick Hausmann & Elisabeth Bechtold-Orth, ‘Changing Remuneration Systems in
Europe and the United States – A Legal Analysis of Recent Developments in the Wake
of the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 195,
198 ff.
27 FSF Principle No. 6 and Implementation Standard No. 9.
28 Commission, ‘Recommendation (2004/913/EC) of 14 December 2004 [. . .]’ [2004] OJ
L385/55 and Commission, ‘Recommendation (2005/162/EC) of 15 February 2005 [. . .]’
[2005] OJ L52/51. See also Ferrarini & Ungureanu, n 14, 474 ff.
29 CEBS, ‘High-level principles on remuneration policies’ (20 April 2009) <https://
www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16094/High-level principles for remuneration
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diately followed the release of the FSB Principles dealt with the utilisation of
debt-based instruments for remuneration purposes.30
In spring 2010, a report of the Commission revealed that member states’
efforts at implementing the Commission’s recommendations on remuneration
left a lot to be desired.31 In November 2010, an amendment to the Capital
Requirements Directive, commonly referred to as Capital Requirements Di-
rective III (CRD III),32 was introduced mainly to deal with issues of remu-
neration. The rules on remuneration were to cover so-called ‘material risk
takers’.33 Acting on a mandate laid down in CRD III,34 CEBS published its
Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (CEBS Guidelines) on
10 December 2010. CRD III and the CEBS Guidelines reinforced the Com-
mission’s previous Recommendation35 and expanded on issues such as better
alignment of risk, performance and remuneration, deferral of bonuses and the
appropriate relationship between variable and fixed pay. To accommodate
smaller financial institutions, national legislators were instructed to account
for differences in terms of size and complexity of the business of regulated
financial institutions when implementing CRD III.36 As regards ‘bonus
bonds’, point 23(o) of Annex II to CRD III stipulated:
‘(o) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50%, of any variable
remuneration shall consist of an appropriate balance of:
(i) [. . .], and
policies.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015; Commission, ‘Recommendation (2009/384/EC) of
30 April 2009 [. . .]’ [2009] OJ L120/22 (merely noting, at para 4.5, that deferred portions
of remuneration can consist of ‘equity, options, cash, or other funds’). On the same day,
the Commission issued a new recommendation supplementing its previous recommen-
dations on directors’ remuneration. See Commission, ‘Recommendation (2009/385/
EC) of 30 April 2009 [. . .]’ [2009] OJ L120/28.
30 In the following, we focus on the role debt-based instruments have come to play in EU
financial market regulation. For more comprehensive accounts of the regulatory efforts
of the EU in the field of remuneration since the financial crisis, see Eilís Ferran, ‘New
Regulation of Remuneration in the Financial Sector in the EU’ (2012) 9 European
Company and Financial Law Review 1, 15–28; Tom Dijkhuizen, ‘The EU’s Regulatory
Approach to Banks’ Executive Pay: From “Pay Governance” to Pay Design’ (2014) 11
European Company Law Review 30, 33–35.
31 Commission, ‘Report of 2 May 2010 [. . .]’ (COM(2010) 285 final), 3.
32 Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 [2010] OJ L329/3. See also Eriksson & McVea, n 2, 109—111.
33 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006
[2006] OJ L177/1 (as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU), Annex V, point 23.
34 Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU), art 22(4).
35 Directive 2010/76/EU, recital 13.
36 ‘Proportionality principle’; see Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive 2010/
76/EU), Annex V, point 23.
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(ii) where appropriate, other instruments within the meaning of Article 66(1a)
(a), that adequately reflect the credit quality of the credit institution as a going
concern.’37
The requirement that a minimum of 50% of bonuses be paid in non-cash instru-
ments was already contained in FSB Implementation Standards No. 8.38 How-
ever, thenoveltyhere lay inpoint (ii). Thiswas the first express acknowledgment
in EU legislation that contingent capital securities39 can serve as a means of
remuneration.40MissingfromtheCommission’soriginalproposal, thereference
to contingent capital securities only found its way into CRD III immediately
before parliamentary discussions. The corresponding report by the Committee
on Economic and Monetary Affairs had even proposed prescribing a much
wider use of contingent capital securities in remuneration in financial institu-
tions.41 In retrospect, this seems fairly remarkable, with only one contingent
capital bond having been issued on the market at the time.42 However, the text
eventually adopted by Parliament and the Council of the EU was considerably
less bold, also lacking the bonus cap proposed in the report.43 Nevertheless, in a
resolution passed on the same day as CRD III, EU Parliament encouraged the
use of ‘non-cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital,
shares or share-linked instruments’ for purposes of variable remuneration44 as
well as ‘pension bonuses’.45
37 Directive 2010/76/EU, recitals 7, 9 and Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive
2010/76/EU), Annex V, point 23(o).
38 The minimum pertains to both the deferred and the non-deferred portions of variable
remuneration. See CEBS, ‘Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices’ (10 De-
cember 2010) para 133 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/106961/Guide
lines.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015.
39 Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 16 September 2009 [2009] OJ L302/97), art 66(1a)(a) read:
‘instruments that must be converted during emergency situations and may be converted
at the initiative of the competent authority, at any time, based on the financial and
solvency situation of the issuer into items referred to in Article 57(a) [i.e., equity instru-
ments] within a pre-determined range [. . .]’.
40 Moreover, Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU), Annex V,
point 23(r), allowed institutions to pay discretionary pension benefits in contingent
capital securities.
41 European Parliament, ‘Report of the European Parliament Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs (ECON) (Rapporteur: McCarthy) of 28 June 2010 (A7-0205/
2010)’ amdts 3 (recommending use of contingent capital securities to better align inter-
ests), 6 and 87 (pension allocations to managers in contingent capital securities), 84 (90%
of non-deferred bonuses in contingent capital securities).
42 See also Ferran, n 30, 25 (noting the difficulties associated with the design of contingent
capital securities and recommending for regulators to proceed with caution).
43 ECON Report of 28 June 2010, n 41, amdt 81.
44 European Parliament Resolution of 7 July 2010 [2010] OJ C351 E/56 para 25.
45 Ibid para 26.
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Despite the audacious efforts of the EU legislators, CRD III failed to induce
financial institutions to use such securities for purposes of remuneration.46
Instead, bankers’ variable remuneration continued to consist of cash, shares,
share-linked instruments and equivalent instruments.
2. Current Regulatory Framework
After a two-year consultation process, the European Commission submitted
proposals to the European Parliament regarding a comprehensive overhaul of
the CRD framework in summer 2011. The proposals consisted of a directive
replacing the original CRD (CRD IV)47 and a new regulation (Capital Re-
quirements Regulation; CRR).48 The primary purpose of the proposals was to
transpose the Basel III rules into EU law. To achieve a level playing field across
member states, prudential rules previously contained in the directive, such as
provisions on capital requirements, were henceforth to form part of the di-
rectly applicable regulation, whereas ‘the access to the activity of the business
of credit institutions’49 as well as supervisory powers of national regulatory
authorities and general principles of supervision were to be addressed in the
directive. In addition, the new directive was to cover both credit institutions
and investment firms.50 The differences between these two types of financial
firms were no longer thought to justify having two separate directives with
largely the same content.51
46 European Banking Authority, ‘Survey on the implementation of the CEBS Guidelines
on Remuneration Policies and Practices’ (12 April 2012) 23 <https://www.eba.euro
pa.eu/documents/10180/106961/Implementation-survey-on-CEBS–Guidelines-on-Re
muneration–final-.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015.
47 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on the access to the activity of credit institutions
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending
[CRD]’ (20 July 2011) COM(2011) 453 final (Commission Proposal for CRD IV).
48 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institu-
tions and investment firms’ (20 July 2011) COM(2011) 452 final (Commission Proposal
for CRR).
49 This includes the authorisation of credit institutions, the exercise of the freedom of
establishment and free movement of services. See Commission Proposal for CRR,
n 48, 1.
50 However, investment firms are additionally subject to other EU legislation. For in-
stance, the access to the activity of investment firms is largely governed by MiFID
(Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004
[2004] OJ L145/1).
51 Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 June 2006
[2006] OJ L177/201 for large parts merely replicated or referred to Directive 2006/48/
EC.
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The provisions on remuneration were thus due for yet another revision, less
than one year after the entry into force of CRD III. The Commission’s pro-
posal for CRD IV was based on, and largely adhered to, CRD III as far as the
rules on remuneration were concerned. To start with, the definition of the
personal scope of application of CRD IV’s rules on remuneration was by
and large carried over from CRD III.52 The Commission’s proposal for
CRD IV also essentially stuck with the provision on the use of contingent
capital securities for purposes of remuneration that had been introduced with
CRD III. It merely suggested it be moved from the Annex of CRD53 into the
main body of the new directive.54
However, remuneration55 once again proved to be a highly contentious topic
and was therefore, among a few other issues, the subject of a special trilogue
between the three EU legislative bodies.56 As a result of this process, EU
legislators57 eventually came up with a compromise. As far as the topic at hand
was concerned,58 the compromise text survived the legislative procedure vir-
tually unchanged and was eventually adopted as article 94(1)(l) of CRD IV.
Point (ii) of this provision adopts an ostensibly more liberal approach than the
Commission’s proposal when it comes to defining what debt-based instru-
ments can be used. It reads as follows:59
‘(ii) where possible [appropriate], other instruments within the meaning of
Article 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 or other instruments
which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or
52 Compare Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU), Annex V,
point 23, with Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 26 June 2013 [2013] OJ L176/338, art 92(2). See also Commission Delegated Regu-
lation (EU) No. 614/2014 of 4 March 2014 [2014] OJ L167/30.
53 Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU), Annex V, point 23(o).
54 Commission Proposal for CRD IV, n 48, art 90(1)(j). The provision referred to in point
(ii) sets forth the requirements for additional tier 1 instruments.
55 The most controversial issue related to the fixed ratio between base pay and variable
remuneration (‘bonus cap’), which was advocated by the European Parliament (see
European Parliament, ‘Report on the proposal of CRD IV (Rapporteur: Karas)’
(30 May 2012) A7-0170/2012, art 90(1)(f)) and initially opposed by the Commission
and the Council.
56 Council of the EU, ‘Report of the Presidency to the Council re Revised capital require-
ments rules (CRD IV) [First Reading]’ (2 March 2013) doc. 6947/13 EF 32 ECOFIN
161 CODEC 455, 5.
57 Council of the EU, ‘Note of the Secretariat of 26 March 2013’ doc. 7746/13 EF 50
ECOFIN 214 CODEC 649.
58 Council of the EU, ‘Note of the Secretariat of 26 March 2013’ doc. 7746/13 EF 50
ECOFIN 214 CODEC 649, 199, art 90(1)(j)(ii).
59 Bold text and brackets indicate changes from Commission Proposal for CRD IV, n 47,
art 90(1)(j)(ii).
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written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the
institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the pur-
poses of variable remuneration.’ (emphasis added).
To alleviate the uncertainty and set out what makes an instrument ‘appropriate
to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration’, the European Banking
Authority (EBA) was given the task of drafting regulatory technical stand-
ards.60 This draft was published in February 201461 and was subsequently
adopted by the Commission without further changes by way of a delegated
regulation (Regulation on Classes of Instruments).62 The Regulation on
Classes of Instruments is directly applicable in member states and came into
effect on 9 June 2014.
3. Debt-Based Instruments Suitable for Variable Remuneration
a) Main Features of the Regulatory Technical Standards
The Regulation on Classes of Instruments sets out in more detail the require-
ments which debt-based instruments need to meet to be considered appropri-
ate for remuneration purposes. Under the Regulation on Classes of Instru-
ments, instruments awarded by way of variable remuneration must convert to
equity instruments or be written down when the Common Equity Tier 1
(CET 1)63 capital ratio drops below a pre-specified threshold of at least 7%.
Remuneration paid in instruments with a lower trigger does not count towards
the 50% portion of overall variable remuneration to be made up of instru-
ments.64 The trigger level of 7% uniformly applies to own funds instruments
and ‘other instruments’,65 exceeding the trigger of 5.125% laid down in CRR66
with regard to Additional Tier 1 (AT 1) instruments. According to the EBA,67
60 Directive 2013/36/EU, art 94(2).
61 See EBA, ‘Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on classes of instruments that are
appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration under Article 94(2) of
Directive 2013/36/EU’ (19 February 2014) (EBA Draft RTS), 19ff, <http://www.
eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/589319/EBA RTS 2014 02 (RTS on instruments for
variable remuneration).pdf> accessed 5 June 2015 (discussing the responses received in
the consultation process).
62 Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014 of 12 March 2014 [2014] OJ L148/21.
63 Within the meaning set out in article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 [2013] OJ L176/1.
64 Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, arts 2(1)(b) (AT1 instruments), 3(c)
(1) (Tier 2 instruments) and 4(2)(e)(i) (other instruments).
65 See nn 75–83 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of this class of instru-
ments.
66 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013, art 54(1)(a)(i).
67 EBA Draft RTS, n 61, 6 and 32.
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the higher trigger level is justified for two reasons. Firstly, CRD IV68 requires
that own funds instruments used for remuneration purposes reflect the credit
quality of the institution as a going concern. The EBA takes the view that this
qualification would not be met by regular own funds instruments with a
trigger of 5.125%. Secondly, a higher trigger level is thought to provide a more
effective incentive for employees to take risks prudently.69
The Regulation on Classes of Instruments further requires that instruments
used for purposes of remuneration comply with the arm’s length-principle in
terms of valuation and interest rate70 and feature adequate deferral and reten-
tion periods.71 They also provide additional guidance regarding conversion/
write-down mechanisms by borrowing from the relevant provision in the
Regulatory Technical Standards on own funds,72 according to which it is for
the management body of the institution to determine that a trigger event has
occurred and to convert or write down the instrument. The Regulation on
Classes of Instruments expands thereon where the specific nature of instru-
ments used for remuneration so requires, e.g., with respect to the notification
of staff.73 In line with the respective provisions in the CRR and the Regulatory
Technical Standards on own funds,74 the Regulation on Classes of Instruments
also sets out the conditions for a write-up.
b) ‘Other Instruments’ in Particular
Well before the enactment of CRD IV, there had been at least one cash-based
scheme that provided for write-down on a contractual basis rather than in-
volving payment in contingent capital securities.75 As set out above, such
68 Directive 2013/36/EU, art 94(1)(l)(ii).
69 The increase regarding the minimum trigger drew considerable criticism in the consul-
tation process, see, e.g., European Banking Federation, ‘EBF response to EBA Con-
sultation Paper on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on classes of instruments that
are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration under Article 94(2)
of the Capital Requirements Directive’ (27 October 2013) 5 <http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/
uploads/EBF_004791%20-%20EBF%20response%20to%20EBA%20consultation%
20on%20classes%20of%20instruments%20%20%20%20.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015
(noting that 5.125% already represents a ‘going concern’ trigger).
70 Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, arts 1(2)(c), (e) and (f), 2(c), 3(d) and
4(2)(f).
71 Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, arts 3(1) and 4(3)(f).
72 CompareCommissionDelegatedRegulation(EU)No. 241/2014of7January2014[2014]
OJ L74/8, art 22(1) with Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, art 5(6).
73 Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, art 5, in particular para 6.
74 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013, art 52(1)(n); Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
No. 241/2014, art 21.
75 See nn 104–110 and accompanying text (Barclays PLC).
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instruments can provide their holder with incentives similar if not identical to
contingent capital securities, depending on the contractual provisions govern-
ing the payments made thereunder. Yet, lacking recognition as own funds
instruments under CRD III, they did not count towards the 50% portion of
variable remuneration to be paid in instruments.76 New capital requirements
introduced in the CRR77 did not resolve the issue. The relevant provisions can
hardly be construed in a way that would allow classification of debt arising
from synthetic instruments as regulatory own funds, perhaps unlike other
legislation implementing the Basel III Accord.78
To facilitate a broader use of synthetic ‘bonus bonds’, EU legislators therefore
included ‘other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity
Tier 1 instruments or written down’ (Other Instruments)79 in the classes of
appropriate instruments. According to the Regulation on Classes of Instru-
ments, Other Instruments are either debt instruments that neither qualify as
AT 1 nor as Tier 2 regulatory own funds, but are subject to comparable con-
version or write-down mechanisms, or synthetic instruments that are linked to
AT 1 or Tier 2 instruments.80 Therefore, Other Instruments can also be based
on a contract between the institution and staff instead of being issued in the
market. This not only eliminates the requirement for a prospectus under the
EU prospectus directive, but also enables the banks to add specific provisions
specifically applicable to employees, such as clauses on retention and deferral,
providing a much greater degree of flexibility. Such employee-related clauses
would run counter to the principle of equal treatment of investors laid down in
the EU prospectus directive were they to be incorporated in the terms and
conditions of a capital instrument issued in the market.81 As for the necessary
link to an own funds instrument, this requires that the synthetic instrument
must not at any time exceed the reference instrument in terms of value and
payouts. In other words, the reference instrument provides a ceiling to pay-
outs to be made under the synthetic instrument. The reference instrument
must either be issued through an entity included within the group consolida-
tion under CRR82 or, in the case of an EU-based subsidiary to a parent under-
76 Directive 2006/48/EC (as amended by Directive 2010/76/EU), Annex V, point 23(o)
(ii).
77 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013, arts 28(1)(b), 52(1)(a) and 63(a).
78 See nn 161–179 and accompanying text on the implementation of Basel III in Switzer-
land.
79 Directive 2013/36/EU, art 94(1)(l)(ii).
80 See EBA Draft RTS, n 61, 5.
81 See also Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, recital 11; EBA Draft RTS,
n 61, 23.
82 Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, art 4(1)(b), (3).
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taking based outside the EU, through a parent undertaking that is subject to
equivalent consolidated supervision.83
4. Conclusion with Regard to EU Legislation
At first glance, it would seem that European legislators wanted to encourage
banks to increasingly use debt-based instruments over other forms of remu-
neration. As discussed above, a growing body of research suggests that there
might be valid reasons to do so.84 However, a more in-depth evaluation reveals
that CRD IV and, to an even larger extent, the accompanying regulatory
technical standards somewhat inhibit the use of debt-based instruments for
purposes of remuneration.
Next we shall examine how, and the extent to which, the British and German
legislators have implemented the relevant EU provisions as well as the effect
this legislation has already had in the respective banking sectors, if any.
B. Implementation of CRD IV and Remuneration Practice
in the United Kingdom
1. Implementation of CRD IV
The United Kingdom was the only EU member state that did not support the
text of CRD IV on its adoption in the Council of the EU.85 Being home to
Europe’s largest financial hub, the United Kingdom feared that tough rules on
bonuses would undermine the competitiveness of its banking sector, in partic-
ular in overseas markets, where not all competitors are subject to comparable
restraints. Consequently, in autumn 2013, the United Kingdom lodged a chal-
lenge with the European Court of Justice on CRD IV, inter alia, on the grounds
that the rules on the bonus cap lacked a sufficient Treaty base.86 Obligations
under EU law forced the United Kingdom to implement CRD IV’s rules on
bonuses by 1 January 2014, irrespective of the fate of the challenge.87
83 Commission Delegated Regulation No. 527/2014, art 4(1)(c), (4).
84 See nn 9–13 and accompanying text.
85 See Council of the EU, ‘Bank capital rules: Council confirms agreement with EP’
(27 March 2013) fn 1 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press
data/en/ecofin/136581.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015.
86 See HM Treasury, ‘Legal challenge launched into new rules on bankers’ pay’ (25 Sep-
tember 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/legal-challenge-launched-into-
new-rules-on-bankers-pay> accessed 5 June 2015.
87 The Advocate General recommended for the action to be dismissed. See Case C-507/13
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Exercising the rule-making powers granted under the amended Financial Serv-
ices and Markets Act 2000,88 the UK regulators Prudential Regulatory Au-
thority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)89 implemented the
relevant provisions by amending the Remuneration Code,90 which is con-
tained in both regulators’ handbooks.91 Regarding the use of debt-based in-
struments as variable remuneration, the UK regulators92 did not go into fur-
ther detail. This is hardly surprising, given the degree of detail already
provided in the relevant CRD IV provision, let alone the accompanying reg-
ulatory technical standards. However, citing proportionality considerations,
FSA guidance that was issued upon the implementation of CRD III in 2011
limited the scope of the rule by exempting staff otherwise subject to the
Remuneration Code who were awarded no more than £500,000 in total remu-
neration, out of which no more than 33% constituted variable remuneration.93
Furthermore, small94 banks and investment firms were also excluded from the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and
Council of the European Union, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen [2014]. The
United Kingdom eventually withdrew its challenge in November 2014.
88 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended by the Financial Services Act
2012), ss 137A, 137G and 137H.
89 Pursuant to the HM Treasury’s The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (PRA-
regulated Activities) Order No. 556 2013, arts 2 and 3, the PRA, which is a part of the
Bank of England, regulates a number of specified activities, such as accepting deposits or
dealing in investments as principal by credit institutions and major investment firms.
Other financial conduct is being regulated by the FCA.
90 The Remuneration Code was originally released by the Financial Services Authority
(FSA) in autumn 2009. It came into effect in early 2010, transposing the FSF Principles
and the FSB Implementation Standards into UK regulation.
91 PRA Handbook, High Level Standards, SYSC (Senior Management Arrangements,
Systems and Controls) 19A <http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/PRA> accessed 5 June
2015; FCA Handbook, High Level Standards, SYSC 19A <http://fshandbook.info/FS/
html/FCA> accessed 5 June 2015. According to PRA Handbook, SYSC 19A.1.1R(1)(d)
and (2), the Remuneration Code also applies to UK staff of overseas firms headquar-
tered outside the EEA. The rules on remuneration will soon be moved from the PRA
Handbook to the new PRA Rulebook. See PRA/FCA, ‘Consultation Paper (PRA
CP15/14/FCA CP14/14), Strengthening the alignment of risk and reward: new remu-
neration rules’ (July 2014) para 1.14 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Docu
ments/publications/cp/2014/cp1514.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015.
92 PRA Handbook, n 91, SYSC 19A.3.47R.
93 FSA, ‘Finalised Guidance 11/22: Remuneration: Proportionality guidance – changes to
the boundary between Tiers 2 & 3 for banks and building societies’ (12 December 2011)
para 39(3) and (4)(b) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/final_guides/2011> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015.
94 For criteria currently applicable see PRA, ‘Supervisory Statement (LSS8/13), Remuner-
ation standards: the application of proportionality’ (April 2013) paras 24 to 26 <http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/pra/policy/2013/remuner
ationstandardslss8-13.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015.
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relevant rule’s scope.95 These exemptions have been carried over into the cur-
rent regulatory framework and remain applicable.96 This is of course not to say
that exempted staff are barred from participating in incentive schemes involv-
ing debt-based instruments. Equally, exempted institutions are free to use
debt-based instruments for purposes of remuneration on a voluntary basis.
The UK regulators are currently taking further steps that will help align in-
terests of managers with those of creditors. Such steps involve extending
minimum deferral periods during which variable remuneration is subject to
malus, as well as requiring regulated firms to amend employment contracts
with material risk takers to allow recovery of vested bonuses (clawback).97
2. Practice
Faced with the new EU rules on variable remuneration, various UK banks
publicly announced in spring 2014 that they were intent on circumventing the
bonus cap by introducing a new class of pay, commonly referred to as ‘allow-
ances’98, which purports to be neither salary (i.e., not pensionable) nor a bonus.
95 FSA, ‘Finalised Guidance 11/22’, n 93, para 34(1).
96 PRA Handbook, n 91, SYSC 19A.3.34G.
97 PRA, ‘Policy Statement (PS 7/14): Clawback’ (July 2014) <http://www.bankofeng
land.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2014/ps714.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015
(amendments to PRA Handbook, in effect since 1 January 2015); PRA/FCA, ‘Con-
sultation Paper (PRA CP15/14/FCA CP14/14)‘, n 91, para 2.10. However, the final
PRA rules have been narrowed from the original proposal as far as malus is concerned,
removing ‘a material downturn in [a financial institution’s] financial performance’ from
the mandatory grounds for applying clawback. Compare PRA, ‘Policy Statement (PS 7/
14)‘, Appendix 1, Annex, SYSC 19A.3.51A and 19A.3.51B with PRA, ‘Consultation
Paper (CP6/14), Clawback’ (March 2014) para 2.2(b) <http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/policy/2014/clawbackcp6-14.pdf> accessed 5 June
2015; PRA Handbook, n 91, SYSC 19A.3.52E.
98 The terminology used has varied across institutions. See, e.g., Barclays PLC, ‘Annual
Report 2013’, 92 (all Barclays reports cited herein are available at: <http://www.bar
clays.com/barclays-investor-relations/results-and-reports/annual-reports.html> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015) (‘role based pay’); HSBC, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 381 <http://
www.hsbc.com/investor-relations/financial-and-regulatory-reports> accessed 5 June
2015 (‘fixed pay allowance’); Lloyds Banking Group, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 102
<http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/investors/2014/2013_
lbg_interactive_annual_report.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015 (‘fixed share award’); Royal
Bank of Scotland, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 69 <http://investors.rbs.com/~/media/Files/
R/RBS-IR/2013-reports/annual-report-and-accounts-2013.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015
(‘fixed share allowance’); Standard Chartered, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 180 <http://
reports.standardchartered.com/annual-report-2013/pdf/2013-Annual-Report.pdf> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015 (‘fixed share allowances’).
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Combined with raising the ratio between variable and fixed remuneration
from 1:1 to 2:1,99 UK banks were hopeful that this new class of pay was going
to help them retain and attract talent, especially in non-EU markets. However,
following a probe into these allowances, the EBA found in October 2014 that
in many cases these allowances represented variable rather than fixed remu-
neration. The EBA therefore advised that banks using such allowances are
expected to change their remuneration policies before the end of 2014.100
As of autumn 2013, UK financial institutions had issued the largest share in the
global market in contingent capital securities.101 Yet, only Barclays, Lloyds
Banking Group and a couple of building societies such as Nationwide102 had
contributed to the total amount of $20.7 billion that were outstanding in such
instruments in the UK as of September 2013.103 While these institutions have
yet to include contingent capital securities in remuneration packages, in 2011
Barclays introduced the so-called Contingent Capital Plan,104 which was to
govern awards of deferred cash bonuses to staff subject to the deferral require-
ments imposed by the Remuneration Code.105 Although the scope of the
Contingent Capital Plan was not limited to 2011,106 Barclays did not make
any further awards thereunder in subsequent years.
In accordance with the Remuneration Code, cash-based awards under the
Contingent Capital Plan made up 50% of all deferred variable remuneration
99 This requires shareholders’ approval. See PRA Handbook, n 91, SYSC 19A.3.44A R
(transposing Directive 2013/36/EU, art 94(1)(g)(ii) into UK regulation).
100 EBA, Opinion of the European Banking Authority on the application of Directive
2013/36/EU (Capital Requirements Directive) regarding the principles on remuner-
ation policies of credit institutions and investment firms and the use of allowances,
15 October 2014, paras 14 f.
101 Avdjiev, Kartasheva & Bogdanova, n 24, 48.
102 Further building societies which have issued contingent capital securities include
Yorkshire Building Society and Chelsea Building Society (on the occasion of their
merger at the end of 2009) and Newcastle Building Society (see press release at:
<http://www.company-newcastle.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CorsicaComp
letionAnnouncement10-5-10.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015.
103 Amount cited after Avdjiev, Kartasheva & Bogdanova, n 24, 48. In September 2014,
HSBC issued its first contingent capital securities, raising approximately $5.6 bn. See
Christopher Thompson, ‘HSBC joins “coco” bond revival’ The Financial Times (Lon-
don, 12 September 2014) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c2bad96e-38d5-11e4-
a53b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GnlKqGG3> accessed 5 June 2015.
104 Barclays PLC, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 167 and 182.
105 Now found in PRA Handbook, n 91, SYSC 19A.3.49 R.
106 See Barclays PLC, ‘Rules of the Barclays Group Share Value Plan’ (last amended on
17 February 2014) (Barclays Share Value Plan) <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/312069/000119312514099379/d686589dex49.htm> accessed 5 June 2015, to which
the Contingent Capital Plan apparently continues to form schedule 3.
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in 2011, with the residual 50% being granted in shares or share-based instru-
ments.107 Payments were made over a three-year schedule, with awards vesting
in three annual tranches. Vesting of these tranches would have been suspended
if the group core tier 1 capital ratio had fallen below 7% as of the vesting date.
Had the capital ratio failed to recover within five years of the suspension, the
awards would have been considered forfeited.108 The Contingent Capital Plan
also provided for payment of a ‘discretionary benefit’ equivalent to a coupon
upon vesting of an award, which was set at 7% for all vesting periods up to
2014.109
In essence, the Contingent Capital Plan merely exposed deferred cash awards
to a new kind of malus provision in exchange for a rather substantial coupon.
As indicated above, it was motivated by regulations that required for deferral of
variable pay. Since abandoning the Contingent Capital Plan in 2012, i.e., merely
one year after its inception, Barclays has been granting deferred cash incentives
to staff under the terms of the so-called Cash Value Plan, which had already
been introduced alongside the Contingent Capital Plan in 2011.110 The Cash
Value Plan ties deferred cash awards to a given number of notional securities,
being either shares or other capital instruments, both in terms of value and
additional payments. Unlike the Contingent Capital Plan, the Cash Value Plan
could therefore meet the standard laid down in the Regulation on Classes of
Instruments on synthetic plans111 if awards were to reference one of Barclays’
outstanding own funds instruments, provided that such reference instrument
was subject to a trigger of at least 7%. Barclays’ Share Value Plan would even
allow paying employees in capital instruments.112 However, to date, Barclays
has neither used regulatory own funds instruments as reference instruments,
nor has it made awards in contingent capital securities. As of 2014, the firm’s
capital ratio continues to be one in an array of measures used to determine
awards and to subsequently adjust unvested awards by way of malus,113 albeit
in much less obvious fashion than with the Contingent Capital Plan.114
Nationwide uses a malus provision whereby outstanding deferred cash awards
under Nationwide’s medium term bonus scheme are to be cancelled if the
107 See Barclays PLC, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 172.
108 Barclays PLC, ‘Notice of Annual General Meeting 2011’, 12 <http://reports.barclays.
com/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/InvestorRelations/PrivateShareholders/2011
AGM/notice-of-meeting.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015.
109 Barclays PLC, ‘Annual Reports 2010’, 182; ‘2011’, 60; ‘2012’, 100; ‘2013’, 124.
110 Barclays PLC, ‘Annual Report 2010’, 180.
111 See nn 80–83 and accompanying text.
112 Barclays Share Value Plan, n 106, Rule 2.10.
113 See Barclays PLC, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 102 ff.
114 See Barclays Share Value Plan, n 106, Rule 3.3 (providing that ‘significant deterioration
of the group’s financial health’ may give rise to malus).
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CET 1 capital ratio falls below 10%.115 Lloyds Banking Group apparently
reserves the right to pay a part of deferred annual bonuses to its directors in
contingent capital securities.116
Although it has yet to issue proper contingent capital securities in the market,
RBS was the first to use junior debt-based instruments for purposes of remu-
neration, announcing as early as February 2009 that, in lieu of discretionary
cash bonuses, it would pay deferred bonuses in subordinated loans.117 How-
ever, in the following year RBS returned to using cash and equity for its bonus
awards to its directors.118 In retrospect, it therefore seems more likely that
immense pressure from the public and the UK government to curb remuner-
ation was the crucial factor in leading majority state-owned RBS to pay bo-
nuses in subordinated debt rather than the alleged benefits of debt-based
remuneration in terms of aligning bankers with interests of creditors.119
115 Nationwide Building Society, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 75, <http://www.nationwide.
co.uk/~/media/MainSite/documents/about/corporate-information/results-and-acco
unts/annual-report-2013.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015 (further noting, at 81, that mutuals
may find it particularly difficult to devise non-cash instruments that are suitable for
remuneration).
116 Lloyds Banking Group PLC, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 86 <http://www.lloydsbanking-
group.com/investors/financial-performance/lloyds-banking-group> accessed 5 June
2015.
117 Royal Bank of Scotland, ‘Annual Report 2008’, 159, <http://www.investors.rbs.
com/~/media/Files/R/RBS-IR/annual-reports/rbs-group-accounts-2008.pdf> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015. Apparently Lloyds Banking Group operated a similar scheme,
albeit on a voluntary basis. See Lloyds Trade Union, ‘LTU & Bank Agree Bonus
Deferral Arrangements’ (Members Newsletter, 19 May 2009) <http://www.ltu.
co.uk/download/638,dynamic> accessed 5 June 2015.
118 Media reports suggest that RBS continued to pay bonuses in subordinated debt in
2012. See Philip Aldrick, ‘BoE tells banks to crack down on bonuses’ The Telegraph
(London, 30 November 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
banksandfinance/9715818/BoE-tells-banks-to-crack-down-on-bonuses.html> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015; Louise Bowman, ‘Bankers’ pay: Bonds. The bonus is in bonds.’
Euromoney.com (November 2012) <http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3110604/
Bankers-pay-Bonds-The-bonus-is-in-bonds.html> accessed 5 June 2015. But see Roy-
al Bank of Scotland Plc, ‘Annual Report 2012’, 325 <http://www.investors.rbs.com/~/
media/Files/R/RBS-IR/annual-reports/annual-report-2012.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015
(only mentioning deferred cash awards without divulging whether sums outstanding
thereunder were subordinated to other debt).
119 See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini & Maria C. Ungureanu, ‘Executive pay at ailing banks and
beyond: a European perspective’ (2010) 5 Capital Markets Law Journal 197, 210–212
(showing that the designs of remuneration systems at RBS and Lloyds were heavily
influenced by the intervention of UK government). See also Patrick Wintour & Jill
Treanor, ‘RBS bonuses to reach £775m despite Treasury tough talk’ The Guardian
(London, 18 February 2009) <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/feb/18/
rbs-bonuses> accessed 5 June 2015; Peter Thal Larsen & Jean Eaglesham, ‘RBS to
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C. Implementation of CRD IV and Remuneration Practice in Germany
1. Implementation of CRD IV
In August 2013, German Parliament passed the CRD IV Implementation
Act,120 whereby the Banking Act121 and other legislation were amended. Some
parts of the CRD IV provisions on remuneration, such as the cap on bonuses,
were incorporated in § 25a(5) of the Banking Act, while other, more technical
issues, such as the requirement that half of variable remuneration be paid in
instruments, were to be implemented in an ordinance by the Federal Ministry
of Finance. To this end, the Federal Ministry of Finance amended the Remu-
neration Ordinance for Institutions (German Remuneration Ordinance),122
which had originally been introduced to implement CRD III.
For reasons of proportionality, the German Remuneration Ordinance divides
institutions into two categories. A number of provisions, including the one123
implementing the requirement for 50% of variable remuneration to be paid in
instruments, only apply to ‘significant’ institutions.124 Their scope is thus
limited to roughly the fifty largest banks in Germany.125
Unlike CRD IV or the relevant provision of the UK Remuneration Code, the
German Remuneration Ordinance does not name the instruments considered
suitable for remuneration. Instead, it rather opaquely requires that at least
50% of variable remuneration be contingent upon the sustained welfare of
the institution.126 Additional guidance on this provision published by the Ger-
man regulator Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) advises
institutions to primarily use shares or share-like instruments to satisfy the
pay bonuses worth up to £950m’ Financial Times (London, 17 February 2009) <http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/81d2f4b8-fd08-11dd-a103-000077b07658.html> accessed 5 June
2015.
120 German CRD IV Implementation Act of 28 August 2013, Federal Gazette (BGBl.)
2013 I p 3395.
121 German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, KWG) of 28 September 2008 (restatement),
Federal Gazette (BGBl.) I p 2776 (German Banking Act).
122 Ordinance on the Supervisory Requirements for Institutions’ Remuneration Systems
(Instituts-Vergütungsverordnung, InstitutsVergV) of 16 December 2013 (restatement),
Federal Gazette (BGBl.) 2013 I p 4270.
123 German Remuneration Ordinance, § 20(4).
124 ie institutions whose balance sheet reaches or is in excess of 515bn, as well as certain
other institutions. See German Remuneration Ordinance, § 17(1).
125 For rankings by assets see <http://www.die-bank.de/fileadmin/images/top100/die-
bank_Top100_2013.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015 (based on balance sheets at the end of
2012).
126 German Remuneration Ordinance, § 20(4) (‘mindestens 50 Prozent [der variablen
Vergütung müssen] von einer nachhaltigen Wertentwicklung des Instituts abhängen’).
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standard set by the Ordinance, adding in passing that debt instruments subject
to write-down or conversion should be used where possible.127
The German approach to implementing article 94(1)(l) of CRD IV seems
rather casual, making no mention of the balance of shares and contingent
capital securities in variable remuneration packages required thereunder,128
and therefore possibly falls short of the standard of implementation under
EU law. However, this may be due to the fact that German banks have only
begun to issue contingent capital securities after the relevant legislation was
enacted. References to contingent capital securities in the context of remuner-
ation may have appeared somewhat premature at the time the German Remu-
neration Ordinance was drawn up. While the flexibility German legislation
seems to afford to institutions in designing remuneration structures should be
welcomed, it has to be noted that it is by and large derogated by the directly
applicable and exceedingly detailed Regulation on Classes of Instruments.129
2. Practice
As noted above, German banks have only begun to issue contingent capital
securities very recently. Their hesitance was largely caused by apprehension
towards possible tax implications. More specifically, there had been doubt
as to whether interest payments made under contingent capital instruments
would be deductible under German tax law. After the German Ministry of
Finance confirmed the tax-deductibility in April 2014, Deutsche Bank went
ahead and issued its first contingent capital instruments.130 Although initially
eager to follow suit,131 other banks seem to have shelved their plans to issue
contingent capital securities for the time being.
127 BaFin, ‘Auslegungsentscheidung: Auslegungshilfe zur Institutsvergütungsverord-
nung’ (1 January 2014) § 20 <http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/
DE/Auslegungsentscheidung/BA/ae_140101_institutsvergv.html> accessed 5 June
2015.
128 See also Stefan Lunk & Friederike Besenthal, ‘Die neuen EU Regelungen zu Banker
Boni’ [2013] Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1010, 1011 (noting, with respect to
Directive 2013/36/EU, art 94(1)(l), that there must be a reasonable balance between
equity-based instruments and debt-based instruments within the meaning of Directive
2013/36/EU, art 94(1)(l)(ii)).
129 See n 60ff and accompanying text.
130 See Deutsche Bank AG, ‘Press Release: Deutsche Bank successfully completes issu-
ance of Additional Tier 1 capital’ (20 May 2014) <https://www.deutsche-bank.de/
medien/en/content/4666_4939.htm> accessed 5 June 2015.
131 Markus Frühauf, ‘Emissionswelle an Risikoanleihen der Banken steht bevor’ Frank-
furter Allgemeine-Zeitung (Frankfurt a. M., 12 April 2014) <http://www.faz.net/ak
tuell/finanzen/anleihen-zinsen/eine-emissionswelle-an-risikoanleihen-der-banken-
steht-bevor-12891961.html> accessed 5 June 2015.
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Considering the above, it is not surprising that incentive structures at large
German banks have so far exclusively revolved around more traditional means
of remuneration, i.e., cash, equity or equity-linked cash awards.132 While
Deutsche Bank continues to use equity-based instruments to satisfy the mini-
mum of 50% of variable remuneration that must be paid in instruments, it
broke new ground in 2014 by introducing a firm-wide malus provision in-
volving the firm’s capital ratio. Should the CET 1 capital ratio at any time drop
below a threshold consisting of the applicable regulatory minimum require-
ment plus an additional 200 basis points, all equity-based awards unvested at
that time will be forfeited.133 Unlike other malus or clawback provisions, this
not only applies to staff subject to the Remuneration Ordinance for Institu-
tions, but also to non-regulated employees. Additionally, the CET 1 capital
ratio is a measure for the calculation of the initial awards.134
The German banking sector traditionally features many state banks and co-
operative banks. As a rule, variable remuneration is less common and generally
makes up a smaller share of total remuneration in German cooperative and
state banks. Unable to link remuneration to equity instruments, state banks
tend to pay variable remuneration in cash, subject partially to deferral and
adjustment provisions to factor in sustained changes in value in order to live up
to the standard laid down in the German Remuneration Ordinance.135
132 See, e.g., Commerzbank AG, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 31, 35 <https://www.commerz
bank.com/media/aktionaere/service/archive/konzern/2015_2/00_CAA_Geschaefts
bericht_2014_Konzern_EN.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015 (variable remuneration made
up of straight cash and equity-linked deferred cash awards), DZ Bank AG, ‘Annual
Report 2014’, 348 <http://www.annualreport.dzbank.com/static/export/docs/DZ
BANK_Group_AR2014.pdf> accessed 5 June 2015 (deferred cash awards subject to
reductions if share price drops below pre-specified thresholds).
133 Deutsche Bank AG, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 235 <https://annualreport.deutsche-bank.
com/2013/ar/servicepages/downloads/files/dbfy2013_entire.pdf> accessed 5 June
2015. See also Deutsche Bank AG, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 268 <https://www.
db.com/ir/en/download/Deutsche_Bank_Annual_Report_2014_entire.pdf> accessed
5 June 2015.
134 Deutsche Bank AG, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 244.
135 See, e.g., Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 28 <http://www.
lbbw.de/media/en/investor_relations/pdf_investorrelations/2015/LBBW_Annual_Re
port_2014.pdf > accessed 3 June 2015 (‘50% of this deferred remuneration is based on
sustained performance’) and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, ‘Remuneration Report
2013’, 8 <http://www.lbbw.de/media/en/investor_relations/pdf_investorrelations/
2013/LBBW_Remuneration_Report_13.pdf> accessed 3 June 2015 (‘50% of the de-
ferred amount is frozen for a period of one year and tied to sustained changes in value’);
BayernLB, ‘Vergütungsbericht 2013’, 8 <http://www.bayernlb.de/internet/media/de/
internet_4/de_1/downloads_5/0821_investor_relations_1/geschaeftsbericht/geschae
ftsbericht_1/2013_16/verguetungsbericht.pdf > accessed 5 June 2015.
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D. Debt-Based Instruments as a Means of Remuneration in Switzerland
1. Swiss Approach towards Contingent Capital Securities
With its financial market in considerable turmoil and one of its two global
banks even teetering on the brink of collapse, Switzerland was clearly badly
affected by the financial crisis of 2007–2009. This experience caused Swiss
lawmakers and regulators to embark on a radical overhaul of financial market
regulations, primarily by amending existing legislation such as the Swiss Bank-
ing Act136 and the Capital Adequacy Ordinance137, but also by passing new
legislation.138 Not being a member state of the EU, Switzerland has been
trying to pursue a fairly independent regulatory approach, whilst still keeping
abreast of, and taking part in, international regulatory activities. Faced with
banking behemoths like UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, whose com-
bined assets in 2011 amounted to roughly four times the Swiss GDP,139 tack-
ling the apparent ‘too big to fail’-problem associated with its two big banks
was obviously a top priority for Swiss lawmakers and regulators. One key
measure to enhance financial stability was the prescription of increased capital
requirements for all Swiss banks with additional requirements for systemic
important financial institutions (SIFIs).140 These new capital requirements,
strengthened in terms of quantity and quality (loss-absorbency), even exceed
the requirements laid down in the Basel III Accord and must be implemented
gradually by 2019.141 In the discussions on the optimal regulatory capital mix,
136 Swiss Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of 8 November 1934 (Swiss Banking
Act), Classified Compilation of Federal Laws (SR) 952.0.
137 Swiss Federal Ordinance Concerning Capital Adequacy and Risk Diversification for
Banks and Securities Dealers of 1 June 2012 (Capital Adequacy Ordinance), Classified
Compilation of Federal Laws (SR) 952.03 (in force since 1 January 2013).
138 This process is far from over, with various draft bills concerning financial markets
currently about to be discussed in Swiss Parliament. See the index of regulatory proj-
ects at: <https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/en/home/dokumentation/finweb/regulierungs
projekte.html> accessed 5 June 2015.
139 See Swiss National Bank, ‘2011 Financial Stability Report’ (June 2011) 14 <http://
www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/stabrep_2011/source/stabrep_2011.en.pdf> accessed
5 June 2015.
140 See Swiss Federal Council, ‘Dispatch on an Amendment of the Banking Act (Strength-
ening Stability in the Financial Sector; Too Big To Fail) of 20 April 2011’ (TBTF-
Dispatch), Swiss Federal Gazette (BBl.) 2011, 4717, 4719; see also Robert Breikreuz
& Jens Vollmar, ‘Contingent Bonds zur Krisenprävention, Eigenmittelvorschriften des
E-BankG zur Begrenzung der Too-Big-To-Fail-Problematik in der Schweiz’ [2011]
Der Schweizer Treuhänder 148, 148; Reto Schiltknecht, ‘Die ‘Too Big to Fail’-Pro-
blematik – neueste Entwicklungen in der Schweiz’ [2010] 82 Swiss Review of Business
and Financial Market Law 435.
141 See Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 143 ff.
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the Swiss Federal Council proposed, inter alia, the creation of a legal founda-
tion for contingent capital securities,142 which were deemed capable of
strengthening banks’ capital bases due to their loss-absorbing characteris-
tics.143 In contrast to the Basel III Accord, Swiss law explicitly recognises
contingent capital securities as an independent category of regulatory capi-
tal.144 It allows banks, and SIFIs in particular, to satisfy part of their increased
capital requirements with such instruments, namely up to 3% for the capital
buffer and a significant part of their progressive component.145 Regulatory
recognition is, however, subject to certain eligibility criteria. For a contingent
capital instrument to be recognised as AT 1 capital, the terms of such instru-
ment must provide for two kinds of triggers causing either conversion or
write-down: (a) a trigger based on the CET 1 capital ratio146 and (b) a so-called
legal trigger. The latter is to secure that a conversion or write-down occur
whenever the financial institution has reached a so-called ‘point of non-via-
bility’ (PONV), i.e., when either (i) a drawdown of emergency financial aid
from public authorities is imminent, or (ii) the Swiss Financial Supervisory
Authority (FINMA) determines that a conversion or write-down is necessary
to avoid the bank’s insolvency or bankruptcy.147 By contrast, Tier 2 capital
instruments only need to be subject to conversion or write-down upon a
PONV-event, while triggers based on capital ratios are optional.148
Even before the formal adoption of the relevant provisions in September
2011,149 Credit Suisse Group AG set a precedent in February 2011 by success-
142 See Final Report of the Commission of Experts for Limiting Economic Risk Posed by
Large Companies (30 September 2010), 24ff <https://www.sif.admin.ch/sif/en/home/
themen/finanzmarktregulierung-und–aufsicht/staerkung-der-stabilitaet-im-finanzsek
tor–too-big-to-fail-/expertenkommission–too-big-to-fail-.html> accessed 5 June
2015; TBTF-Dispatch, n 140, 4751 ff.
143 TBTF-Dispatch, n 140, 4768 ff., in particular 4774 ff.
144 TBTF-Dispatch, n 140, 4752; see Reto Schiltknecht & Christopher McHale, ‘Erste
Erfahrungen mit dem bedingten Wandlungskapital (CoCos)’ [2012] Swiss Journal of
Corporate and Capital Markets Law and Reorganizations (GesKR) 507, 511; René
Bösch & Benjamin Leisinger, ‘Contingent Convertible Bonds – CoCos’ [2012] 84
Swiss Review of Business and Financial Market Law (SZW) 2, 5; Peter Böckli, ‘CoCos,
Write-offs: Eigenkapitalbeschaffung mit dem Zauberstab’ [2012] 84 Swiss Review of
Business and Financial Market Law (SZW) 181, 185.
145 Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 129(2) (re capital puffer) and art 130(2) (re progres-
sive component). See also Theodor Härtsch, Contingent Convertibles – Practical con-
siderations and implementation’ [2011] Swiss Journal of Corporate and Capital Mar-
kets Law and Reorganizations (GesKR) 193, 194.
146 See Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 27(3).
147 See Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 29(2).
148 See Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 30(3) in connection with art 29(1) and (2).
149 See Swiss Banking Act, art 11(1)(b) in connection with art 13 (re conversion) and
art 11(2) (re write-down).
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fully issuing contingent capital securities with a conversion mechanism to
external investors. Further issuances by different Swiss issuers followed.150
The subsequent eligibility of contingent capital securities as regulatory capital
only added further to the popularity of these instruments.
2. Debate on Remuneration and Current Regulatory Framework
In light of the described Swiss regulatory approach, remunerating bank exec-
utives with contingent capital securities seems appealing for financial institu-
tions, not only to improve incentive structures for their executives, but also to
meet the imposed increased capital requirements. So far, however, the current
debate on remuneration in Switzerland has not yet focused on this new means
of remuneration. Academic discussion has only recently begun to analyse this
idea. Although the financial crisis intensified the debate in Switzerland on
management remuneration, the political discussions primarily concentrated
on the limitation of excessive management remuneration rather than on the
actual design of remuneration schemes. One prominent offspring of these
discussions was the successful federal popular initiative against rip-off salaries
of 2013 (the Minder Initiative151), seeking to control executive pay of listed
companies and to increase shareholders’ say in corporate governance.152 How-
ever, the constitutional amendment brought about through the adoption of the
Minder Initiative does not address the design of remuneration schemes and
nor does the federal legislation enacted as a result of the adoption do so
either.153 Other popular initiatives that were arguably more radical (in partic-
ular on determining a hard cap on management remuneration) did not find
support in the Swiss population.154
150 For some examples thereof, see Schiltknecht & McHale (2012), n 144, table at 523.
151 Named after its initiator, Thomas Minder, who is now a member of the upper chamber
of Swiss Parliament, the Council of States.
152 The Minder Initiative was passed by a majority of Swiss population on 3 March 2013. It
was subsequently temporarily implemented by way of an ordinance (Ordinance
Against Excessive Remuneration in Listed Companies of 20 November 2013, Classi-
fied Compilation of Federal Laws (SR) 221.331) until a final law will be adopted. This
new legislation is not specifically tailored to financial institutions, but concerns listed
companies in general. Its primary objective is to strengthen the shareholders’ rights
with a view to improving corporate governance in listed companies rather than actually
cutting or limiting management remuneration.
153 See n 152.
154 The ‘1 : 12 – for fair salaries’-initiative, which aimed at fixing the top management’s
remuneration at a maximum of 12 times the remuneration of the lowest paid employee
in the same firm, was clearly rejected by the Swiss population on 24 November 2013.
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Stricter guidelines, including specific rules on the design of remuneration
schemes, have been set in place for financial institutions in the regulatory
context. Inspired by the FSF Principles, the Swiss Financial Market Super-
visory Authority (FINMA) published in its circular 2010/1 ‘Remuneration
Schemes’ ten principles on remuneration schemes of financial institutions.155
No. 7 of these Principles requires financial institutions to defer payment of
part of the remuneration156 in such a way that it optimally promotes the risk
awareness of the beneficiaries and encourages them to operate the business in a
sustainable manner.157 Akin to the international standards briefly discussed
above, the FINMA-Circular provides only vague guidelines as to the recom-
mended deferral time period.158 It should be pointed out in this context that
the functioning of the incentive structure envisaged by remunerating bank
executives in contingent capital securities is always going to be very much
dependent on an appropriate deferral period. For regulatory reasons in con-
nection with the recognition of these capital instruments, it might additionally
be necessary to coordinate deferral time periods with required minimum
terms.159 Similarly opaque are FINMA’s directions on the proportion of var-
iable remuneration to total remuneration and the relationship between imme-
diate and deferred remuneration.160 The said FINMA-Circular is, however,
silent on the forms of financial instruments to be used in remuneration
schemes of financial institutions, neither encouraging nor prohibiting debt-
based remuneration schemes. It needs to be added, though, that the increased
complexity associated with debt-based remuneration schemes is only recon-
155 These principles are considered minimum standards for the design, implementation,
and disclosure of remuneration schemes in financial institutions. See FINMA, ‘Circu-
lar 2010/1 Remuneration Schemes, Minimum standards for remuneration schemes of
financial institutions’ (21 October 2009) (in force since 1 January 2010), margin note 2
<http://www.finma.ch/e/regulierung/Documents/finma-rs-2010-01-e.pdf> accessed
3 June 2015. They are aimed at setting up an optimal incentive structure in remuner-
ation schemes in order to promote the long-term success and stability of the company.
See FINMA-Circular, n 155, margin note 1.
156 See FINMA-Circular, n 155, margin notes 48 ff.
157 See FINMA-Circular, n 155, margin note 51.
158 As the deferral should link remuneration with the future development of performance
and risk, the time period for the deferral should be tied to the time horizon of the risk
the beneficiary of the remuneration is responsible for. For members of senior manage-
ment, other persons with a relatively high total remuneration, and key risk takers, the
time period for the deferral should be at least three years. The greater the responsibility
of a beneficiary and the greater her or his total remuneration, the greater the percentage
of her or his remuneration should be deferred. Compare FINMA-Circular, n 155,
margin notes 51 ff.
159 See n 172 (Tier 2 instruments) and nn 175 ff. (AT 1 instruments) and accompanying
text.
160 See FINMA-Circular, n 155, margin note 38 in connection with margin notes 30 ff.
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cilable with difficulty with Principle No. 2 of the FINMA-Circular according
to which the remuneration scheme should be simple and comprehensible for
current and potential beneficiaries. In conclusion, the current regulatory
framework in Switzerland seems to be at least neutral towards the use of
contingent capital securities in remuneration schemes of financial institutions,
even supporting their implementation due to their regulatory treatment.
3. Treatment of Debt-based Remuneration Schemes in Terms
of Capital Adequacy
Pursuant to the Basel III Accord, an inclusion of capital instruments in Tier 1
or Tier 2 regulatory capital components requires, inter alia, that such capital
instruments be ‘issued and paid-in’. Unlike the relevant CRR provisions,161
article 20(1) of the Capital Adequacy Ordinance does not strictly adhere to the
Basel III Accord, but takes a more liberal approach by requiring own funds
instruments to be ‘either fully paid-in or internally generated’. The rationale
behind the insertion of the words ‘internally generated’ is not entirely clear. In
any event, they give rise to the question whether debt obligations under syn-
thetic remuneration schemes162 may qualify as regulatory capital if they are
subject to appropriate write-down or conversion163 mechanisms.164
Under a literal interpretation of the term, deferred awards under a synthetic
remuneration scheme would arguably qualify as ‘internally generated’ to the
extent they have been expensed165 prior to the vesting date of the respective
award, reducing the profit available for distribution in a manner similar to
provisions for future liabilities.166 By repeatedly referring to the narrower term
161 See nn 77–78 and accompanying text.
162 Such instruments would fall within the category of ‘Other Instruments’ under EU
regulations. See nn 75–83 and accompanying text.
163 In a purely contractual setting, such write-down can be implemented relatively easily
by subjecting deferred cash bonuses to an appropriate malus provision. See nn 104–110
and accompanying text (re Barclays’ Contingent Capital Plan). Designing conversion
mechanisms might be significantly more complex.
164 The latter would be in line with the favourable stance of lawmakers towards the
adoption of contingent capital securities-based remuneration schemes by banks. See
TBTF-Dispatch, n 140, 4774 (suggesting the use of contingent capital securities to
avoid adverse incentives inherent to other means of remuneration).
165 The point in time when the actual expenditures are made (e.g., a minimum term of five
years) determines the eligibility of the instruments for recognition as Tier 2 or AT1
capital. See Schiltknecht & McHale (2015), n 2, 17.
166 For regulatory recognition, it is not sufficient to only commit to remuneration pay-
ments. Regulatory recognition will only be available when the payment obligations
towards the employees have been recorded as expenditures. See Schiltknecht &
McHale (2015), n 2, 17.
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‘conversion capital’167 in lieu of the broader term ‘capital instrument’, the
pertinent provisions in the Capital Adequacy Ordinance on capital require-
ments for SIFIs would rather suggest a strict interpretation, prohibiting an
extension on synthetic remuneration schemes. This understanding would also
be in line with the narrow language used in the Basel III Accord. Adopting a
more functional approach, it could be argued that synthetic remuneration
schemes incorporating write-down or conversion mechanisms generally have
loss-absorbency capabilities comparable to issued capital instruments and
should therefore be treated equally. Their loss-absorbency capabilities could,
however, be drawn into question by the fact that awards to different employ-
ees under a synthetic remuneration scheme are typically not governed exclu-
sively by one single document of terms and conditions. It is therefore quite
conceivable that, in addition to the terms of the scheme and the agreement
under which the award was granted, there exist further agreements between
the financial institution and an employee participating in the scheme that
could come to have a bearing on the outcome of a court case. Furthermore,
it cannot be ruled out that local labour laws in the countries in which bene-
ficiaries to the plan reside168 may void contractual malus or clawback mech-
anisms that are based on the financial institution’s capital ratio if, e.g., such
mechanisms are considered to constitute an unlawful transfer of the business
risk from employer to employee.
The annual reports of 2013 und 2014 from Switzerland’s largest banks, how-
ever, clearly indicate that FINMA seems to recognise synthetic remuneration
schemes as own funds instruments169 and consider remuneration liabilities
eligible for recognition as AT 1 or Tier 2 capital, as the case may be, provided
that they contribute to loss-absorbency upon the occurrence of a trigger
167 As per the definition given in Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 126(1), this term only
encompasses contingent capital securities that have been issued in the market.
168 Whether restrictive provisions of local labour laws can be circumvented via appropri-
ate choice-of-law clauses depends on the choice-of-law rules of the relevant jurisdic-
tion.
169 UBS AG, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 252 ff. <http://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/
investor_relations/annualreporting/2014.html> accessed 3 June 2015; Credit Suisse
Group AG, ‘Annual Report 2014’, 205, <https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/cc/
docs/publications/annualreporting/2014/csgag-csag-ar-2014-en.pdf> accessed 3 June
2015; see also UBS AG, ‘Annual Report 2013’, 231 <http://www.ubs.com/global/
en/about_ubs/investor_relations/annualreporting/2013.html> accessed 3 June 2015.
Although neither report states approval by FINMA on the respective scheme specif-
ically, it is all but certain that such approval had been given because Swiss regulations
require the banks to obtain prior approval from FINMA on all AT 1 instruments as
well as Tier 2 instruments that are to count towards the progressive capital buffer. This
observation is confirmed by a recent article of Schiltknecht & McHale (2015) (n 2),
16ff, two FINMA executives.
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event.170 Such recognition is in any event contingent upon prior FINMA
approval, allowing FINMA to check whether all requirements set out in the
Capital Adequacy Ordinance for recognition as AT 1 and Tier 2 capital, re-
spectively, are met.171
As far as Tier 2 capital is concerned, an up-front expenditure of the entire
remuneration amount is required. Partial expenditures, e.g., conducted on an
annual basis, are not permissible since each partial expenditure would per se
not meet the requirement of the five year minimum term.172 A legal amorti-
sation obligation requires that the eligible amount of Tier 2 instruments be
reduced by 20% each year in the last five years of their term.173 Absent a
trigger event and after expiration of the minimum term, payouts to employees
may, in contrast to AT 1 instruments, not be refused on the grounds of an
inappropriate capital base.174 This is a significant advantage of Tier 2 instru-
ments.
When it comes to AT 1 capital, the requirement for perpetual duration175 may
confront financial institutions with further difficulties in designing synthetic
remuneration schemes for the purposes of generating regulatory capital: as
financial institutions are not obliged by law to repay the principal of perpetual
AT 1 capital instruments prior to entering into liquidation, beneficiaries of
remuneration schemes designed for recognition as AT 1 capital would de facto
be doomed to remain invested in the instrument forever, unable to monetise
their claims by offloading them in the market.176 From an incentive point of
view, this hardly seems to be an attractive proposition for employees.177 How-
ever, it could be argued that, from an economic perspective, prior cash payouts
to beneficiaries generally do not impair the loss-absorbing capabilities of such
instruments as long as the total amount of liabilities under the remuneration
scheme – the total ‘notional principal’ if considered as a pool of several ‘no-
tional bonds’ – remains unaffected over time. This could be reached either
(i) by transferring ‘notional bonds’ from the recipient of a cash payment at
170 Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 127.
171 Swiss Banking Act, art 11(4); see also Capital Adequacy Ordinance, arts 27(5) and
127(2).
172 Schiltknecht & McHale (2015), n 2, 18.
173 Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 30(2).
174 See Schiltknecht & McHale (2015), n 2, 18.
175 Basel III Accord, para 55(4) and Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art. 27(1)(b).
176 Eriksson & McVea (n 2, 104) (noting that the risk of conversion/write-down is in-
creased due to the perpetual duration requirement; accordingly, a higher coupon yield
is required to reflect this higher risk).
177 There is a problematic tension between the obligation to pay out vested awards and the
concept of a regulatory perpetual capital instrument. See Schiltknecht & McHale
(2015), n 2, 18.
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vesting to another beneficiary, or (ii) by replacing existing ‘notional bonds’
with new ones ahead of payouts, i.e., by awarding additional ‘notional bonds’
to the same beneficiary before the original ones vest.178 According to this line
of argument, a financial institution would be allowed to make payouts to
beneficiaries of the remuneration scheme at the vesting date of their interests,
provided the overall ‘rolling pool of notional bonds’ has been sufficiently
replenished. In line with the above, such pool of ‘notional bonds’ will in
any event only be recognised as AT 1 capital up to a certain level to control
for payouts to beneficiaries. In contrast to Tier 2 instruments, there will always
be uncertainty for the remuneration scheme beneficiaries whether payouts
would be refused by FINMA referring to an inappropriate capital base.179
4. Practice
Probably because of the illiquidity of Swiss contingent capital securities mar-
kets and the problem related thereto of timely procuring such capital instru-
ments, remuneration schemes involving actually issued contingent capital se-
curities have not been in use in Switzerland until now. However, both major
Swiss banks, UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, currently maintain syn-
thetic remuneration schemes with write-down mechanisms under which bank
managers are paid in ‘notional bonds’.
The mandatory Deferred Contingent Capital Plan (DCCP) of UBS AG was
initially (in 2012–2013) set up as a Tier 2 capital instrument. In the beginning of
2015, UBS AG announced180 the plan’s redesign into a Tier 1 capital instru-
ment and declared that it would continue running it as a AT 1 instrument as of
the end of 2014. Under the current plan, employees whose total remuneration
is in excess of USD/CHF 300,000181 are annually awarded part of their remu-
neration182 in the form of interest-bearing183 ‘notional additional Tier 1 (AT1)
178 Schiltknecht & McHale (2015), n 2, 17-18.
179 Capital Adequacy Ordinance, art 27(1)(d).
180 UBS Media Release dated 23 January 2015 <http://www.ubs.com/global/en/about
_ubs/media/switzerland/releases/news-display-media-switzerland.html/en/2015/01/
23/compensation.html> accessed 5 June 2015; see also UBS AG, ‘Annual Report 2014’,
n 169, 245.
181 For 2014, over 5,000 employees received DCCP awards. See UBS Group AG, ‘Com-
pensation Report 2014’, 34 <http://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/investor_re
lations/annualreporting/2014.html> accessed 5 June 2015.
182 In general a portion of 40% of their variable remuneration.
183 Employees may receive discretionary interest payments at a notional interest rate of
7.125% for awards denominated in USD and 4% for awards denominated in CHF for
grants in 2015. Interest rates are based on the current market rate for such AT 1
instruments.
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instruments’ (notional bonds), which can, at the discretion of UBS, be settled
either in the form of a cash payment or a perpetual, marketable AT 1 instru-
ment.184 This current design contrasts the ancient Deferred Contingent Cap-
ital Plan, under which the awards granted qualified as Tier 2 capital, requiring
the instruments to have a minimum duration of five years and to be fully
expensed up-front.185 Under both plans, awards granted are forfeited if the
CET 1 capital ratio falls below 10% for members of the group executive board
and 7% for all other bank employees respectively. In addition, awards are
forfeited if a PONV-event occurs, i.e., (i) if a write-down will be prescribed
by FINMA to prevent the bank’s insolvency or bankruptcy, or (ii) if UBS AG
receives a commitment of extraordinary support from the public sector.
Awards vest in full after five years subject to there being no trigger event.
Credit Suisse Group AG, in turn, went from the outset for recognition of their
Contingent Capital Awards as AT 1 capital.186 For 2014, the total Contingent
Capital Awards awarded to 5,891 employees had a fair value of CHF 360
million. Contingent Capital Awards are scheduled to vest on the third anni-
versary of the grant date and will be expensed gradually over the vesting
period. As a result of its ongoing grant practice, the volume of the recognised
AT 1 capital will steadily increase in an initial work-up phase. For payouts of
the initial awards to be permissible at their vesting date (i.e., at the end of 2016
for the awards granted in 2013), recognition of the scheme as AT 1 capital will
need to be limited to the combined amount outstanding under the unvested
awards (i.e., awards granted in 2014, 2015 and 2016), or, in other words, to
what will be left in the ‘rolling pool’ after the payout has been made. Con-
tingent Capital Awards provide a conditional right to receive semi-annual
interest payments187 and will be written down either (i) if the Credit Suisse
Group’s reported CET 1 capital ratio falls below 7%, or (ii) if a PONV-event
occurs. At settlement, employees will receive, at the discretion of Credit Suisse
Group AG, either contingent capital instruments or a cash payment based on
the Contingent Capital Awards’ fair value.
184 If UBS does not achieve an adjusted profit before tax for any year during the vesting
period, group executive board members will lose 20% of their award each loss-making
year. See UBS Group AG, ‘Compensation Report 2014’, n 181, 34.
185 UBS AG, ‘Annual Report 2013’, n 169, 231. Vesting of the awards was accordingly
aligned with the term of the instrument and thus only occurred upon maturity of the
instrument (cliff vesting).
186 Credit Suisse Group AG, ‘Annual Report 2014’, n 169, 205.
187 For Contingent Capital Awards granted in January 2015, interest rate equivalents are
paid until settlement at a rate of 4.85% p.a. over the six-month CHF LIBOR for CHF-
denominated awards or 5.75% p.a. over the six-month USD LIBOR for USD-de-
nominated awards.
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IV. Analysis
Inventory – Our observations above show that contingent capital securities
have so far remained fairly limited in their practical application for the purpose
of remuneration. European financial institutions have, up to now, not been
keen on using them for purposes of remuneration. Barclays set a precedent in
2011 by designing a cash-based remuneration plan modelled on contingent
capital securities, only to abolish it just one year later. The idea of ‘bonus
bonds’ has had more legs in Switzerland where the two major banks, UBS
AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, have recently implemented synthetic remu-
neration schemes that contractually replicate contingent capital securities.
Thanks to a broader definition of regulatory capital in Swiss capital adequacy
regulations, the two banks even managed to obtain recognition of their remu-
neration schemes as regulatory capital.
While the notion of contingent capital has yet to catch on with U.S. legislators
and regulators, several incentive plans in place at large U.S. financial institu-
tions involve the Tier 1 capital ratio as a measure for adjusting awards made
under these plans.188 The same applies to financial institutions in other EU
jurisdictions.189 Some of these arrangements have already been in place for
multiple years.190 The adjustments to be carried out under the respective plans
are mostly confined to unvested awards (malus) but occasionally also cover
vested awards (clawback). A closer look reveals that the remuneration
schemes of Barclays, UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, that have at times
been referred to as ‘bonus bonds’, also operate by imposing such malus pro-
visions on what are essentially deferred cash awards.
Appraisal – We do not think there is anything wrong with this preference of
banks for synthetic remuneration schemes. There being no efficient secondary
188 See, e.g., The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., ‘Proxy Statement 2014’, 37 (Tier 1 capital
ratio below regulatory minimum for 90 consecutive days leading to forfeiture of
equity-based awards made to named executive officers); Bank of New York Mellon
Corp, ‘Proxy Statement 2014’, 34 (Basel I Tier 1 ratio of 9% at end of calendar year as a
minimum funding requirement for annual incentives); The PNC Financial Services
Group, Inc., ‘Proxy Statement 2014’, 46, and Form of Performance Based Stock-Pay-
able Restricted Stock-Units Award Agreement, S 6.2 (failure to meet regulatory mini-
mum tier 1 capital ratio as of a year-end date resulting in forfeiture of tranche of equity-
based remuneration attributed to that year).
189 Société Générale SA, ‘2013 Remuneration Policies and Practices Report’, 15 <http://
www.societegenerale.com/en/about-us/governance/annual-general-meeting> ac-
cessed 5 June 2015 (noting that deferred share-based awards to chief executives will
be forfeited if CET 1 ratio drops below 8%).
190 Goldman Sachs and Bank of New York Mellon first referred to the Tier 1 capital ratio
as a ground for forfeiture in 2010. See The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., ‘Proxy State-
ment 2011’, 24; Bank of New York Mellon Corp, ‘Proxy Statement 2011’, 53.
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market as yet for contingent capital securities awarded as remuneration and
with awards presumably continuing to be subject to vesting or otherwise
restricting provisions, employees are unlikely to have a strong preference
for either awarded contingent capital securities or deferred cash bonuses when
either will lose their value in the event of a material deterioration of the CET 1
capital ratio.
Furthermore, synthetic schemes afford greater flexibility to institutions, e.g.,
by enabling them to contractually attach further employee-specific malus
provisions that would not be permissible in an issued instrument. They are
also easier to implement, especially if the financial institution has yet to issue
contingent capital securities. However, this contractual flexibility in designing
synthetic remuneration schemes may also have substantial drawbacks when it
is abused to the disadvantage, or even detriment, of the employees. They might
have been better protected against the bargaining power of their employer if
they were remunerated in rigid issued contingent capital securities. Another
issue inextricably connected with complex synthetic remuneration schemes is
the conflict of interest that the ‘designers’ of such a scheme will find them-
selves in when they personally stand to benefit from it.191
Another argument in favour of synthetic remuneration schemes is grounded
on the fact that bank employees, and in particular bank executives, form (as
recipients of contingent capital instruments) a special group of investors, dis-
tinguishing themselves from external investors through their ability to exert
influence on the issuer and their privileged access to information by virtue of
their functions.192 In light of this insider knowledge, it is advisable to avoid the
existence of tradable claims during the term of the instrument, allowing a
dangerous split between economic interest and insider position. Exerting con-
trol over such claims seems to be more feasible in a synthetic remuneration
scheme than in the event of issued and therefore tradable instruments.
But even where the institution has previously issued contingent capital instru-
ments, trading in these securities may often be rather infrequent due to the still
nascent market in these kinds of securities. This market illiquidity may make it
difficult, or at least expensive, to timely obtain the securities needed to satisfy
claims arising under a remuneration scheme. In conclusion, it is in our view
this substitutability that compellingly explains the fairly limited proliferation
of contingent capital securities in remuneration schemes of financial institu-
tions.
191 Gaurav Tosniwal, ‘Contingent Convertible Bonds and Banker Compensation: Poten-
tial Conflicts of Interest?’ (2011) 1, Harvard Business Review Online, 80 <http://
www.hblr.org/2011/04/contingent-convertible-bonds-and-banker-compensation-po
tential-conflicts-of-interest/> accessed 5 June 2015.
192 See Schiltknecht & McHale (2015), n 2, 19.
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Outlook – If deferred cash awards subject to appropriate malus conditions
were to become eligible for recognition as regulatory capital not only in
Switzerland but on a global scale, this would of course only add to their
popularity with banks, many of which are still in dire need of regulatory
capital. However, this does not currently seem a likely prospect, given the
narrower definitions of regulatory capital in both the Basel III Accord and
European legislation. Moreover, it is still untested whether malus and claw-
back indeed provide the same loss-absorbing capabilities as contingent capital
instruments. It remains thus to be seen whether EU legislation, coupled with
the ongoing surge in the issuance of contingent capital securities, will be
enough to convince European banks to more frequently include ‘bonus bonds’
in remuneration packages and which form193 they will choose in doing so.
193 Interestingly, the draft Guidelines on sound remuneration policies recently published
by the EBA suggest that institutions lacking a ‘sound capital base’ should apply malus
or clawback to previously awarded variable remuneration. Naturally, this would only
further contribute to the proliferation of malus and clawback arrangements relying on
the CET 1 capital ratio, should the draft Guidelines be enacted in their current form.
See EBA, ‘Consultation Paper. Draft Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under
Article 74(3) and 75(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU and disclosures under Article 450 of
Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013’, 4 March 2015, para 112 <http://www.eba.europa.eu/
regulation-and-policy/remuneration/guidelines-on-sound-remuneration-policies/-/
regulatory-activity/consultation-paper> accessed 5 June 2015.
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